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Abstract
We study a prototypical model of a Parliament with two Parties or two Political
Coalitions and we show how the introduction of a variable percentage of randomly
selected independent legislators can increase the global efficiency of a Legislature,
in terms of both the number of laws passed and the average social welfare obtained.
We also analytically find an ”efficiency golden rule” which allows to fix the optimal
number of legislators to be selected at random after that regular elections have
established the relative proportion of the two Parties or Coalitions. These results
are in line with both the ancient Greek democratic system and the recent discovery
that the adoption of random strategies can improve the efficiency of hierarchical
organizations.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science 8 June 2011
1 Introduction
In ancient Greece, the cradle of democracy, governing bodies were largely
selected by lot [1,2,3]. The aim of this device was to avoid typical degener-
ations of any representative institution [4]. In modern democracies, however,
the standard is choosing representatives by vote through the Party system.
Debate over efficiency of Parliament has therefore been centred on voting sys-
tems, on their impact on parliamentary performances and, ultimately, on the
efficiency of economic system [5,6,7,8]. In recent years also physicists have
started to provide a quantitative understanding of social and economical phe-
nomena [9,10,11,12,13,14,15] and it is in this perspective that the present
work should be placed. In this paper, rediscovering the old Greek wisdom
and recalling a famous diagram about human nature by C.M.Cipolla [16], we
show how the injection of a measure of randomness improves the efficiency of
a parliamentary institution. In particular, we present numerical simulations
of the efficiency of a prototypical Parliament modeled by means of an agent
based model [17]. We also find an analytical expression, whose predictions are
confirmed by the simulations, that determines the exact number of randomly
selected legislators, in an otherwise elected parliament, required to optimize
its aggregate performance. The latter is estimated by the number of approved
acts times the average social gain. This result, on one hand is in line with
the positive role which random noise plays often in nature and in particular
in physical systems [18,19,20]. On the other hand, it goes also in the same
direction of the recent discovery [21,22] that, under certain conditions, the
adoption of random promotion strategies improves the efficiency of human
hierarchical organizations in order to face the problem of the so-called ”Peter
Principle” [23].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the Parliament
model and its dynamics. In Section 3 we present the main numerical and an-
alytical results. Then, in Section 4, we discuss several historical examples in
order to give an empirical support to our findings. Finally, conclusions and
remarks are drawn.
2 The Parliament Model
Human societies need institutions [24,25], since they set the context for indi-
viduals to trade among themselves. They are expected, therefore, to have an
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Fig. 1. Cipolla Diagram. Each point in this diagram, with coordinates in the intervals
[−1, 1], represents a member of Parliament, according to his/her attitude to promote
personal or social interests. The Parliament consists of N = 500 members: black
points represent Nind = 250 independent legislators, while green and red points refer
to the remaining members, belonging to the two Parties P1 and P2. We report also
the circles of tolerance of the two Parties, with equal radius r=0.3, see text for
further details. Please notice that some free points could apparently fall within the
circle of tolerance of some Party, but of course the correspondent legislators will
remain independent.
impact on the final outcome of those trading relations [26]. This paper looks
at a specific institution, the Parliament, designed to hold the legislative power
and to fix the fundamental rules of society.
2.1 The Cipolla Diagram
A Parliament can be modeled as resulting from the aggregate behavior of
a number of legislators, who are expected to make proposals and vote. In so
doing they are pictured as moved by personal interests, like re-election or other
benefits, and by a general interest. Taking both motivations into account, it is
possible to represent individual legislators as points li(x, y) (with i = 1, ..., N)
in a diagram (see Fig.1), where we fix arbitrarily the range of both axes in the
interval [−1, 1], with personal gain on the x-axis and social gain (understood
as the final outcome of trading relations produced by law) on the y-axis.
Each legislator will be therefore described through his/her attitude to promote
personal and general interest.
This diagram takes after a very famous one proposed in 1976 by the economic
historian Carlo M. Cipolla [16], who represented human population according
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to its ability to promote personal or social interests. Of course people do not
always act consistently, therefore each point in the Cipolla diagram represents
the weighted average position of the actions of the correspondent person.
The basic idea of this study is to use the Cipolla classification in order to
elaborate a prototypical agent based model [17] of a Parliament with only one
Chamber, consisting of N = 500 members and K = 2 Parties or Coalitions,
and to evaluate its efficiency in terms of both approved acts and average
social gain ensured. In particular, all the points ljk(x, y) representing members
of given Party Pk will lie inside a circle with a given radius rk and with a
center Pk(x, y) falling in one of the four quadrants. The center of each Party
is fixed by the average collective behavior of all its members, while the size of
the respective circle indicates the extent to which the Party tolerates dissent
within it: the larger the radius, the greater the degree of tolerance within the
Party. Therefore, we call the circle associated to each Party circle of tolerance.
It is clear that, in real Parliaments, the fact of belonging to a Party increases,
for a legislator, the likelihood that his/her proposals are approved. But it is
also quite likely that the social gain resulting from a set of approved proposals
will be on average reduced if all the legislators fall within the influence of
some Party (more or less authoritarian). In fact, even proposals with little
contribution to social welfare will be approved if Party discipline prevails,
while, if legislators were allowed to act according to their judgement, bad
proposals would not receive a large approval. Therefore, the main goal of this
paper is to explore how the global efficiency of a Parliament may be affected
by the introduction of a given number Nind of independent members, i.e.
randomly selected legislators free from the influence of any Party, which will be
represented as free points on the Cipolla diagram. The independent members,
once randomly selected for a given legislature, should not be candidates in
any successive legislature, to avoid the risk of being ”captured” by existing
Parties or Coalitions.
2.2 Dynamics of the Model
The dynamics of the model is the following. During a Legislature L each leg-
islator (agent) li(x, y) (independent) or ljk(x, y) (belonging to Party Pk) can
perform only two simple actions: (i) proposing an act and (ii) voting (for or
against) a proposal.
The first action does not depend on the membership of the agent: each legisla-
tor proposes one or more acts of Parliament (an, with n = 1, ..., Na, being Na
the total number of acts proposed by all the legislators during the Legislature
L), with a given personal and social advantage depending on his/her position
on the diagram (i.e. an(x, y) ≡ li(x, y) for every act proposed). It follows that
legislators belonging to a Party can propose acts which are not perfectly in
agreement with the Party’s common position, as function of their distance
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Fig. 2. In this Figure we show an example of the voting process. The two grey areas
in Cipolla Diagram indicate the acceptance windows of an independent legislator
li(x, y) and of a Party Pk′. Given the proposal an(x, y), advanced by a legislator
ljk(x, y) belonging to the Party Pk, a new ”voting point” an(x
∗, y) has been randomly
extracted over the (gray) line y = y(an) and compared with the two acceptance
windows. Since the voting point falls within the window wi(x, y) of li, this legislator
will vote the correspondent act. The same proposal would be voted also by all the
members ljk′ of the Party Pk′ , since it also falls within the window wk′(x, y) (see
text).
from the center Pk(x, y) of the correspondent circle of tolerance.
The action of voting for, or against, a proposal is more complex and strictly
depends on the membership of the voter and on his/her acceptance window.
The acceptance window is a rectangular window on the Cipolla diagram into
which a proposed act an(x, y) has to fall in order to be accepted by the voter,
whose position fixes the lower left corner of the window (see Fig.2). This fol-
lows from the assumption that we imagine ideal legislators who are able to
recognize better or worse proposals than their ones, but only accept proposals
better than (or equal to) their ones. The main point is that, while each free
legislator has his/her own acceptance window, so that his/her vote is indepen-
dent from the others vote, all the legislators belonging to a Party always vote
by using the same acceptance window, whose lower left corner corresponds to
the center of the circle of tolerance of their Party. Furthermore, following the
Party discipline, any member of a Party accepts all the proposals coming from
any another member of the same Party.
It is now important to stress that, while the perception of the social advan-
tage y(an) (i.e. the y-coordinate) of a given act an can be likely considered as
unambiguously determined for each legislator or Party, the perception of the
personal advantage x(an) (i.e. the x-coordinate of an) cannot. Indeed, the fact
that a certain an(x, y) would be favorable for a given legislator, does not imply
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that it should be favorable for another legislator or for a Party. Therefore, the
coordinate x(an) of any proposed act has to be different for any legislator or
Party and will be expressed by a random number x∗, uniformly extracted in
the interval [−1, 1]: it is this new position an(x
∗, y), called voting point and
lying on the line y = y(an) (see Fig.2), that has to be compared with the ac-
ceptance windows of legislators and Parties. It follows that, from the personal
advantage point of view, the act can be either approved or rejected depending
on whether the voting point lies on the right or left of the acceptance window
corner. Finally, once all the N members of Parliament voted for or against a
certain proposal, the latter will be accepted only if receives at least N
2
+ 1 fa-
vorable votes. We indicate with Nacc the overall number of accepted proposals.
At this point we need some global quantity which in some way would be able
to express the efficiency of the Parliament during a Legislature L.
An immediate measure of the Parliament activity could be the percentage
of accepted acts over the total Na, i.e. N%acc(L) = (Nacc/Na) ∗ 100. But an-
other important quantity is surely the average social welfare ensured by all
the accepted acts of Parliament, expressed by Y (L) = Nacc
−1 ∑Nacc
m=1 y(am). It
is therefore convenient to take the product of these two quantities in order to
obtain the global efficiency of a Legislature:
Eff(L) = N%acc(L) ∗ Y (L). (1)
that is expressed by a real number included in the interval [-100,100]. We
anticipate that, in order to obtain a measure independent of the particular
configuration of Parliament, the global efficiency (1) has to be further averaged
over many Legislatures, each one with the same number of proposals but with
a different distribution of legislators and Parties on the Cipolla diagram.
3 Simulation Results
In our simulations we will focus on a Parliament with N = 500 members dis-
tributed over two Parties or Coalitions P1 and P2 with different relative sizes,
a configuration which is simple and interesting at the same time, being typical
of many Countries with a bipolar political system. We will also consider a set
of NL = 100 Legislatures, each one with a total number of Na = 1000 pro-
posals. In order to study how the global efficiency of the Parliament depends
on the number Nind of independent legislators, let us consider, first, the two
limiting cases Nind = 0 and Nind = N .
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3.1 Parliament with 2 Parties and Nind = 0
The efficiency of a Parliament without independent legislators strictly de-
pends, for a given Legislature L, on the random position of the centers of the
two Parties, with coordinates, respectively, x(P1), y(P1) and x(P2), y(P2) over
the Cipolla diagram, but also on their size (in terms of percentage of members)
and on the radius r of their circle of tolerance. Suppose to assign a percentage
p = 60% of legislators to P1 and the remaining (40%) to P2. Let us consider a
sequence of Na = 1000 acts of Parliament, proposed each time by a randomly
chosen legislator. Actually, in the further limiting case of a radius r = 0 (i.e.
all the positions of the members of a Party coincide with its center), we have
the following two possibilities, each one with probability 1/2:
(i) If y(P2) < y(P1), only the acts of Parliament coming from Party P1 will be
accepted, since members of P1 will never vote for any proposal coming from
P2, and the percentage of accepted proposal during the Legislature L will be
equal to the percentage p of members of Party P1, i.e. N%acc(L) ∼ 60%; it
follows that the average social welfare Y (L) of the accepted acts should ap-
proximately coincide with the y-coordinate of P1, i.e. Y (L) ∼ y(P1).
(ii) If y(P2) > y(P1), in addition to all the proposals of P1, will be also accepted
those proposals of P2 which will randomly fall in the acceptance window of
P1. This will depend on the coordinate x(P1) and will occur with a probability
1−x(P1)
2
. Such a probability is 1 for x(P1) = −1, 0 for x(P1) = 1 and, on aver-
age, is equal to 1/2. Therefore, being the number of proposals coming from P2
approximately the 40% of the total, in average only 20% of those should be
accepted, thus yielding with respect to the previous case an increase in both
the percentage of accepted proposals and the average social welfare. Of course
non-null values of the radius r will produce slight modifications in these pre-
dictions, since the positions of the members of a Party start to spread within
the circle of tolerance.
In Fig.3 we show the simulation results obtained for the set of NL = 100
Legislatures, each one with a different position of P1 and P2 over the Cipolla
diagram. A small radius r = 0.1, equal for both the Parties, has been chosen
in order to check the predictions obtained for r = 0. For each Legislature Lh
(h = 1, ..., NL) the correspondent values of N%acc(Lh), Y (Lh) and Eff(Lh)
have been plotted in three distinct panels (from top to bottom). At the end
of the simulation the average values AV (N%acc), AV (Y ) and AV (Eff) have
been calculated and reported in the panels as dashed lines (with the respective
numerical value on the right side).
As expected, the number of accepted proposalsN%acc(Lh) oscillates, with prob-
ability 1/2, between 60% (case (i)) and a number around 80% (case (ii)), thus
producing an AV (N%acc) ∼ 70%, while the value Y (Lh) oscillates between −1
and 1 thus producing an almost null average value AV (Y ) = 0.05 (this is the
case because the values y(P1) will result uniformly distributed along the y-
axis when considers the entire set of 100 Legislatures). Consequently, also the
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Fig. 3. Simulation results for a Parliament with 500 members distributed into two
Parties P1 and P2 with, respectively, the 60% and 40% of legislators (as shown
in Fig.2) and radius r1 = r2 = r = 0.1. No independent legislators are present
(Nind = 0). In the three panels we plot (from top to bottom), for a set of NL = 100
Legislatures (each one with a different position of P1 and P2 over the Cipolla dia-
gram), the percentage of accepted proposals, the average social Welfare and the cor-
respondent global Efficiency, calculated as the product of the previous two quantities.
For each Legislature L an array of Na = 1000 proposals has been considered. The
averaged values for the three quantities are reported on the right and are sketched
with a dashed line inside the panels.
product N%acc(L) ∗ Y (L) will oscillate around zero and the average efficiency
of the Parliament AV (Eff) = 0.57 is quite small (notice that, following the
definition, the range of variation of Eff(Lh) is [−100, 100]). This means that
a Parliament without legislators free from the influence of Parties turns out
to be rather inefficient (as probably happens in reality).
3.2 Parliament with no Parties and Nind = N
Let us consider, now, the opposite situation in which only independent legis-
lators make up in the Parliament. In this case no Parties exist and the points
li(x, y), corresponding to the N = 500 members of Parliament, are uniformly
distributed over the Cipolla diagram. It is evident that now a given act of
Parliament an(x, y) will be accepted only if the majority
N
2
+1 of these points
will fulfill the prescriptions y(li) < y(an) and x(li) < x
∗(an), being x
∗(an) the
x-coordinate of the voting point an(x
∗, y), randomly extracted with uniform
distribution over the straight line of equation y = y(an) for each legislator li
which is requested to vote for an.
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Fig. 4. Simulation results for a Parliament with (Nind = 500) independent members,
without any Parties. As in the previous figure, in the three panels we plot (from top
to bottom), for a set of NL = 100 Legislatures (each one with a different distribution
of free points, representing the independent legislators), the percentage of accepted
proposals, the average social Welfare and the correspondent global Efficiency. For
each Legislature L an array of Na = 1000 proposals has been considered. The aver-
aged values for the three quantities are reported on the right and are sketched with
a dashed line inside the panels.
Being li(x, y) uniformly distributed on the plane, for a given value of y(an)
only about 50% of the N˜(an) legislators with y(li) < y(an) will accept the pro-
posal. But such a number will be clearly lower than N
2
unless y(an) ∼ 1, since
only in this latter case the half-plane y < y(an) will coincide with the entire
Cipolla diagram and N˜(an)
2
∼
N
2
. Thus it follows that, during a Legislature L,
only a very small number of proposals will be accepted, but with a very high
social gain y(an) ∼ 1.
In Fig.4 we show analogous simulations as in Fig.3, but in this opposite case
with 100% of independent legislators (Nind = 500). It results that, averag-
ing again over 100 Legislatures, the previous predictions are confirmed: as
expected, we find a very small value for AV (N%acc) ∼ 2% (top panel) and a
very high value for the social Welfare AV (Y ) = 0.893 (middle panel: here, the
few points with Y (L) = 0 correspond to Legislatures with N%acc = 0%). But
it follows that, as in the case with 0% independent legislators, the efficiency
of a Parliament with only independent members will be quite small again: as
it is visible in the bottom panel of Fig.4, the product N%acc(L) ∗ Y (L) will
stay near zero for all the Legislatures, thus giving an average global efficiency
AV (Eff) = 1.78. It looks therefore that no particular benefit stems from
abolishing Parties altogether.
Now, once having explored these two limiting cases, it is interesting to see
9
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Fig. 5. Simulation results for a Parliament with N = 500 members, two Parties P1
and P2, with circles of tolerance of two sizes, i.e. r1 = r2 = 0.1 (full circles) and
r1 = r2 = 0.4 (empty circles), and an increasing number of independent legislators
Nind. For each value of Nind, we distribute the remaining legislators (N − Nind)
into the two Parties with percentages 60% and 40%. In Panel (a) we show the
average number of accepted proposals, AV (N%acc), which monotonically decreases
with Nind. In Panel (b), on the contrary, the average value of the social Welfare
AV (Y ) is shown to increase with Nind. See text for further details.
how the efficiency of a Parliament with two Parties (or, more in general, two
political coalitions) is affected by the increase of the number of independent
members from Nind = 0 to Nind = 500.
3.3 Configurations with 2 Parties and an increasing number of independent
legislators
In the simulations shown in Fig.5 we vary from 0 toN the number Nind of inde-
pendent legislators in a Parliament with N = 500 members and we distribute
the remaining legislators (N − Nind) into the two Parties with percentages
60% and 40% and with radius 0.1 and 0.4 (equal for the two Parties). We see
that, increasing Nind, (i) the average number of accepted proposals AV (N%acc)
decreases from ∼ 70% to ∼ 2%, Panel (a), while, on the other hand, (ii) the
average value of the social Welfare AV (Y ) increases from ∼ 0 to ∼ 0.9, Panel
(b). In both cases the increase/decrease is monotonic and it is not much in-
fluenced by the value of r. At this point it is interesting to explore what is the
behavior of the product of these two quantities, i.e the behavior of the global
efficiency AV (Eff) of the Parliament, emerging from the interplay between
the accepted proposals and the social welfare they provide. Actually, we ob-
served that AV (Eff) turns out to be quite small in both the limiting cases
with 0 and N independent legislators (see Figs.3 and 4, bottom panels), so it
makes sense to ask what happens in the intermediate region 0 < Nind < N .
In Fig.6 we answer to this question by plotting the global efficiency of the
Parliament as function of an increasing number of independent legislators.
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Fig. 6. The global efficiency of a Parliament with N = 500 members and two Parties
P1 and P2, with circles of tolerance of two sizes, r = 0.1 (circles) and r = 0.4
(squares), is plotted as function of an increasing number of independent legislators
Nind. Each point represents an average over 100 Legislatures, each one with 1000
proposals of acts of Parliament coming from randomly selected legislators. The three
panels differ in the percentage of the (N−Nind) members assigned to the two Parties.
In Panel (a): 51%, 49%; Panel (b): 60%, 40%; Panel (c): 80%, 20%. In all the
panels, for a specific N∗ind (indicated by a vertical dashed line), it is visible a peak
in efficiency which shifts from left to right going from the top to the bottom panel
(see text).
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In particular, the case 60% − 40%, that we considered in Fig.3 and Fig.4, is
plotted in panel (b). The two curves corresponds to two different sizes of the
circles of tolerance, with radius, respectively, r = 0.1 and r = 0.4 (equal for
both the Parties). Each point of a given curve represents, as usual, an aver-
age over 100 Legislatures, each one with 1000 proposals of acts of Parliament.
The result is very interesting, because it clearly appears that the efficiency,
albeit with a fluctuating behavior, rapidly increases with the number of inde-
pendent legislators until it reaches a peaked maximum for N∗ind = 140, then
smoothly decreases towards the known limiting value ∼ 2. This means, on one
hand, that the introduction of any number of independent legislators, out of
the influence of any Party, in general improves the efficiency of a Parliament
and, on the other hand, that exists an optimal percentage of these legislators
which makes the efficiency of the Parliament the highest possible. It is also
interesting to observe that the maximum value of efficiency decreases when
the radius r increases from 0.1 to 0.4, implying that the constructive role of
independent legislators is sensitive to the degree of freedom in the Parties:
the more authoritarian Parties are (cases r = 0.1), the more the role of in-
dependent legislators becomes decisive. When, on the contrary, Parties are
libertarian (cases r = 0.4), efficiency tends to no longer depend on the num-
ber of independent members.
We also simulated different configurations of the Parliament, changing the size
of the two Parties. In panel (a) of Fig.6 we assigned percentages of 51% and
49% to the Parties, and the result is that the peak in efficiency occurs much
early than before, with N∗ind = 20 independent legislators. Such an effect is
quite reasonable because it suggests that, if the two competing Parties have
a similar size, even a small number of independent members working in the
Parliament, playing a role of balance, can fairly improve its global efficiency.
On the other hand, when one Party is quite bigger that the other one, like in
the simulations shown in the panel (b), the number of independent legislators
required to enhance the efficiency of the Parliament increases.
This trend is confirmed in panel (c) of Fig.6, where a Parliament with one
Party very much bigger (80%) than the second one (20%) has been considered:
as expected, after a very oscillating initial behavior, the (smoother) peak shifts
on the right with respect to the previous panels and the maximum efficiency is
obtained with the introduction of N∗ind = 280 independent legislators. Finally,
also in the last two panels the efficiency depends on the radius of the circles
of tolerance of the two Parties, and in general decreases as it is increased.
Notice that in all the cases, while the values of AV (Eff) for Nind = 0 can
be different for the curves with different radius, going towards Nind = N the
two curves tend to coincide, since the dynamics (and therefore the efficiency)
becomes independent of the radius of the Parties.
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3.4 The Efficiency Golden Rule
Unlike the relatively simple behavior of the system in the two limiting cases
Nind = 0 and Nind = N , the general case with 0 < Nind < N is much more
complex to manage and it is absolutely not trivial to predict the efficiency
value of the peaks shown in the three panels of Fig.6, which stays approxi-
mately constant although it depends on all the features that affect the voting
process. However, quite surprisingly, a simple formulation exists to work out
the optimal number N∗ind of independent legislators as function of the size p
(in percentage) of the majority Party.
Actually, we could argue that, in a given Legislature with two Parties of dif-
ferent sizes, none of which holding the absolute majority of the members in
the Parliament (due to the presence of independent members), N∗ind would be
in some way associated to the minimum number of independent legislators
which, added to the majority Party P1, allows it to reach the threshold of
N
2
+ 1 members necessary to accept a given proposal an. But we know from
the previous subsection that, being the independent legislators lj(x, y) uni-
formly distributed over the Cipolla diagram, for a given value of y(an) only
about 50% of all the independent members with y(lj) < y(an) will vote for the
proposal, equivalent to the N˜(an) points lying in the left half of the half-plane
below the line of equation y = y(an). Such a rule continues to apply also when
Parties exist. In this case, being a generic y(an) randomly distributed over the
y-axis throughout many Legislatures, we can safely say that, on average, the
line y = y(an) will coincide with the x-axis, therefore, for a given Nind, only
Nind
4
independent members (i.e. those lying in the left half of the half-plane
y < 0) will vote the proposal. Thus, in order to find N∗ind, we just need to
add this number to the number of members of the majority Party P1, i.e.
(N −N∗ind) ·
p
100
, and to impose the following equality:
(N −N∗ind) ·
p
100
+
N∗ind
4
=
N
2
+ 1 (2)
Finally, solving this equation with respect to N∗ind, one easily obtains:
N∗ind =
2N − 4N · (p/100) + 4
1− 4 · (p/100)
. (3)
This prediction closely matches the numerical results of simulations performed
for several values of p, as shown in Fig.7. We checked that it is true for several
sizes N of the Parliament and that is independent of the number of Legislatures
and of the number of proposals for each Legislature. Being also independent
of the radius of the circles of tolerance of the Parties, we argue that Eq.(3)
could be considered an universal golden rule for optimizing the efficiency of
any social situation with two competing groups of elected people through the
13
Fig. 7. The optimal number of independent legislators N∗ind is plotted (full circles) as
function of the size p (in percentage) of the majority Party P1, for our Parliament
with N = 500 members and two Parties. An average over 100 Legislatures, each one
with 1000 proposals of acts of Parliament, has been performed for each point. This
plot is invariant for values of the radius of the Parties in the range [0.1, 0.5]. The
dashed line represents the prediction of the efficiency golden rule, reported also in
the upper part of the figure (see text).
introduction of randomly selected independent voters.
The reason why Eq.(3) performs quite well can be easily grasped with the
aid of intuition: since any majority, held by a Party larger than 50 %, brings
no contribution to social welfare (being AV (Eff) ∼ 0 for Nind = 0), one
could easily go without it. However, bringing the majority down to 50 % will
allow for a larger share of independent legislators. Such legislators, on one
hand (in a measure equal to Nind/4) will help the relative majority Party to
retain its majority, on the other (again in a measure equal to Nind/4) will offer
proposals with a positive contribution to social welfare which are bound to
be voted by that very majority. So nothing is lost from the positive role of
the Party system (effectiveness in voting) and all is gained from the role of
independent legislators (the quality of their proposals). Thinking of a practical
application for a real Parliament, the knowledge of the golden rule would allow
to fix the optimal number of accidental politicians to be chosen at random, by
picking them up from a given list of candidates (i.e. ordinary citizens fitting
the requirements), after that regular elections have established the relative
proportion of the two Parties or Coalitions.
As a last remark, we also observe that from Eq.(3) it follows immediately
that one has N∗ind >
N
2
for p
100
> 3
4
+ 2
N
(with N ≥ 8). This means that,
when N >> 2, the optimal number N∗ind of independent legislators overcomes
the threshold for reaching the majority in the Parliament if the biggest Party
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exceeds pth = 75% (notice that, for N → 8,
p
100
= 3
4
+ 2
N
tends to 1 and the
threshold value pth tends to 100%). Actually, we saw that in the case 80%−20%
(panel (c) of Fig.6) our Parliament with N = 500 (>> 2) members reached its
maximum efficiency with N∗ind = 280 independent legislators: therefore, in this
case the independent legislators alone would have the majority of the seats.
This is another reason for imposing the constraint that, in general, randomly
selected legislators should not be candidates in any successive legislature, to
reduce also the risk that they could join and vote together acting as a new
majority Party.
4 Discussion and Historical Review
In this section we discuss some historical facts which provide substantial
and successful empirical support to our results. In fact, for a modern po-
litical observer, our findings could probably sound very strange. Today, most
people think that democracy means elections, i.e. believe that only electoral
mechanism could ensure representativeness in democracy. However, as already
mentioned in the introduction, in the first significant democratic experience,
namely the Athenian democracy, elections worked side by side with random
selection (sortition) and direct participation. Actually, in that period Parties
did not exist at all and random selection was the basic criterion when the task
was impossible to be carried out collectively in the Assembly, where usually
Athenian citizens directly made the most important decisions. Of course only
the names of those who wished to be considered were inserted into the lottery
machines, the kleroteria [1,2,3].
Sortition was not used in Athens only. Probably, already others Greek city-
states adopted the Athenian method, even if historical documentation is du-
bious. For sure, many other cities in the history used some kind of lot as rule,
such as Bologna, Parma, Vicenza, San Marino, Barcelona and some parts of
Switzerland. Lot was also used in Florence in the 13th and 14th century and
in Venice from 1268 until the fall of the Venetian Republic in 1797, providing
opportunities to minorities and resistance to corruption [27].
In the course of history, little by little, the concept of representativeness over-
lapped with that of democracy, until it became its synonymous. Consequently,
today, in contemporary institutions, almost any random ingredient has been
expunged. Among the few historical vestiges of sortition, there are the forma-
tion of juries in some judicial process and the selection by lot in some public
policy [28]. Actually, even if nowadays the information and communication
technology would revitalize the possibility of direct democracy, (the so-called
E-democracy), this idea meets opposition as much as random selection, since
the representative system, and his correlated Party system, is strongly be-
lieved to be the only way to make society a democratic place.
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On the other hand, the drawbacks of Party system have been well documented.
For example, the iron law of oligarchy of the sociologist Robert Michels [4],
states that all forms of organization, democratic or not, inevitably develop
into oligarchies. The indispensability of leadership, the tendency of all groups
to defend their interests and the passivity of represented people, are only a few
of the many reasons that deteriorate every democratic Party system. In the
representative democracy this process is even institutionalized. Party elites act
to serve the Party and themselves, often at the expenses of the public interest.
If some members of Parliament vote against the Party line on any issue, these
are likely to be ostracized, expelled, or not endorsed at the next elections.
Of course free elections are an indubitable progress in comparison with au-
thoritarian regimes, but today the electoral system tends to form a democratic
aristocracy, where representatives are superior to the electorate. In particular,
the representativeness is organized by ideas, or classes, which flow together
into the Parties’ programs. Unfortunately, this kind of organizations (in turn,
institutions) very slowly accept social changes because of various rents that
they ensure. Therefore, in the last decades, the idea of choosing representatives
by random selection has been re-introduced in political thinking and gained
a fair number of supporters [29,30,31,32,33]. Demarchy, or statistical democ-
racy, is the name proposed by someone [34]. According to these supporters
there would be several advantages in the sortition method. For example, so-
cial and demographic features (income, race, religion, sex,) would get a fair
distribution in the parliament, so the interest of the people would get a more
effective representativeness and politically active groups in society, who tend
to be those who join political Parties, would not be over-represented. On the
other hand, representatives appointed by sortition do not owe anything to
anyone for their position, so they would be loyal only to their conscience, not
to political Party, also because they are not concerned in their re-election.
Furthermore, sortition may be less corruptible than elections. It is easy to
ensure a totally fair procedure by lot. On the contrary the process of elections
by vote can be subject to manipulation by money and other powerful means.
In this context our results, on one hand, provide a quantitative confirmation
of the poor efficiency of a Parliament based only on Parties or Coalitions (see
the case Nind = 0) and, on the other hand, sustain in a more rigorous way the
constructive role of independent, randomly selected, legislators. In any case, it
is worthwhile to stress that, in our model, the electoral system is not abolished
altogether, but only integrated with a given (exactly determined) percentage
of randomness, a feature which could be implemented in a simple way in real
systems.
Before closing this section, let us remark that our findings are also perfectly in
line with recent studies [21,22] about the effectiveness of random promotion
strategies in hierarchical organizations. In these studies, the strategy of pro-
moting people at random has been shown to be, under certain conditions, a
successful way to circumvent the effects of the so-called ”Peter Principle” [23]
and to increase the efficiency of a given pyramidal or modular organization.
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We think that random selection could be of help in contrasting Peter Principle
effects also in the context of parliamentary institutions, which are exposed to
analogous risks linked to the change of competences required to the elected
people in their new political positions.
5 Conclusions and Remarks
In this paper, by means of a prototypical Parliament model based on Cipolla
classification, we showed in a quantitative way that the introduction of a
well-defined number of random members into the Parliament improves the
efficiency of this institution through the maximization of the social overall
welfare that depends on its acts. In this respect, the exact number of random
members has to be established after the elections, on the basis of the electoral
results and of our analytical ”golden rule”: the greater the size difference
between the Parties, the greater the number of members that should be lotted
to increase the efficiency of Parliament [35].
Of course our prototypical model of Parliament does not represent all the real
parliamentary institutions around the world in their detailed variety, so there
could be many possible way to extend it. For example it would be interesting
to study the consequences of different electoral systems by introducing more
than two Parties in the Parliament, with all the consequences deriving from
it. Also the government form could be important: our simple model is directly
compatible with a presidential system, where there is no relationship between
Parliament and Government, whereas, in the case of a parliamentary system,
also such a link should to be considered in order to evaluate the overall social
welfare. For simplicity, we chose to study a unicameral Parliament, whereas
several countries adopt bicameralism. So, simulating another chamber could
bring to subsequent interesting extensions of the model. Finally, we expect
that there would be also several other social situations, beyond the Parliament,
where the introduction of random members could be of help in improving the
efficiency.
In conclusion, our study provides rigorous arguments in favor of the idea that
the introduction of random selection systems, rediscovering the wisdom and
the history of ancient democracies, would be broadly beneficial for modern
institutions.
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